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DOES "PRACTICALITY" HAVE A PLACE IN
THE "CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW"?
Russell L. Weaver*
In this article, I talk about a hodge-podge of things that I do
in my constitutional law classes and books. I am not sure that
they rise to the lofty title of "The Canon of Constitutional Law,"
but I view them as worthwhile and worth discussing.
I. DIALOGUE

In our constitutional law casebook, one thing we do is to
engage in a dialogue among the authors. 1 I cannot take credit
for this innovation; it was Don Lively's idea. We have a diverse
group of authors (racially, sexually and ideologically) with quite
different perspectives on constitutional issues, and this diversity
produces very interesting discussions. We hope that the discussions benefit our students.
For example, the debate on affirmative action is intense. 2
Don Lively questions the "wisdom of reliance upon legal innovation to fix an acute societal pathology.'' 3 I question the permissibility and desirability of race-based affirmative action, and argue
that it should be replaced by programs that favor the economically disadvantaged.~ I point out that such programs would have
greater impact, yet "disproportionately favor" AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, but would "generate less hostility
since they function on a race neutral basis."5 Dorothy Roberts
and Phoebe Haddon articulate passionate defenses of race-based
* Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville.
1. See Donald E. Lively, et al., Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues
(Anderson, 2d ed. 2000).
2. See id. at 808-14.
3. ld. at 809.
4. ld. at 809-10.
5. ld. at 810.
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affirmative action programs.6 Bill Araiza argues that "as long as
there is a reasonable showing of real, explicit or structural historical discrimination with likely effects persisting to the present
day, the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment must
allow legislative attempts at focused race-conscious relief."7
II. BLENDING 1HEORY AND PRACTICE
One of my constitutional law objectives is to blend theory
and practice. I have done this for many years in my nonconstitutional law classes. 8 In recent years, I have carried this
blending over to my constitutional law classes and to a forthcoming First Amendment casebook. 9
Why do I worry about "practice" and "practical things?"
After all, constitutional law is one of the few places where we
can focus on the arcane without fear of criticism. I do so for a
variety of reasons. First, in light of the Macerate Report/ 0 I
have tried to integrate "skills training" into substantive classes. I
realize that the Macerate Report seeks more, but I place my
students in "practical situations" so that they are better prepared
for practice. Second, and perhaps more importantly, I believe
that practical problems reinforce theory and help students take
the theory to a deeper level.
Permit me to provide an example. In Kentucky, the establishment clause is a hot issue. Despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Graham,11 one Kentucky
school district refused to take down the Ten Commandments.
During the last year, nine other districts have re-posted the
Commandments. From a "theory" perspective, one can easily
say that all of these districts are acting unconstitutionally. Some
of the districts have tried to distinguish Stone using what I con6. Id. at 810-13.
7. Id. at 814.
8. See generally Russell L. Weaver, et al., Modern Remedies: Cases, Practical
Problems and Exercises (West, 1997); William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro, and Russell L.
Weaver, Administrative Procedure and Practice: Problems and Cases (West, 1997); see
also Russell L. Weaver, et al., Criminal Procedure: Theory Practice and Procedure (forthcoming West, 2001).
9. See Russell L. Weaver and Arthur D. Hellman, The First Amendment (forthcoming, Lexis Pub., 2001).
10. See Robert McCrate, Chairperson of Task Force, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on LAw
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (American Bar Assoc. Sec. of Legal
Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, July 1992).
11. 449 u.s. 39 (1980).
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sider to be makeweight arguments (i.e., the postings are permissible because copies of the Ten Commandments are paid for and
posted by private groups). Nevertheless, those who want to
challenge the postings face intense practical problems. Many of
the districts where the Ten Commandments are posted are small
communities with strong social pressures, and no one who has
standing is willing to be a plaintiff. So, I ask my students to assume that they are in practice, and ask them how they can remedy this unconstitutional practice. Are there ways around the
standing problem? For example, is it possible to sue the Kentucky Department of Education and join individual school districts as defendants? Are there other ways to obtain standing?
Unless these "practical" problems can be solved, Stone's injunction is meaningless. Students need to realize this. They also
need to think about whether, if no one in the community objects,
we should care.
In the last week, a bill was introduced in the Kentucky Legislature that would authorize a school district's voters to decide
whether the Ten Commandments may be posted in classrooms
in that district. Does this bill make a difference? If Kentucky
passes the law, might it be possible to challenge the law and join
individual districts?
For a second example, I use a state park that has erected a
Christmas display on park grounds. The display contains nonChristian displays including Frosty the Snowman, Rudolf the
Red-Nosed Reindeer, Santa Claus, Mrs. Claus, Santa's house,
elves, decorated Christmas trees (decorated in a secular fashion),
along with lighted reindeer, candy canes, and a sleigh. This is a
large display, which covers several miles, and visitors drive
through it. A visitor complains that the park has taken the
"Christ out of Christmas." She asks the park to include a creche
containing the baby Jesus surrounded by the three wise men and
camels. Alternatively, if the park is unwilling to erect the creche
itself, she would like for the park to permit her to erect one on a
piece of land set aside for that purpose. The woman is supported by a Christian legal foundation which intends to sue if her
demands are not met. I ask the students to assume that they are
representing park officials, and to think about how they would
respond to the demands. May the park erect a creche as part of
the display? May it allow the complainant to set up her own display? What are the downsides of each approach? What happens if the park allows the complainant to erect a display, and
then the Ku Klux Klan asks for permission to put up a cross?

344

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:341

Would the park have to grant the Klan's request, or could it
grant the complainant's request and deny the Klan's? So, how
do you advise park officials about how to proceed?
In the affirmative action area, I ask students to examine and
evaluate the University of Louisville's affirmative action program. For students, those programs include race-based scholarships available only to African-American students, and a doctoral aid program which provides tuition reimbursements and
stipends to African-Americans pursuing advanced degrees. On
faculty hiring, the University's policies require the hiring of African-Americans. If a recruitment committee is under an affirmative action obligation, and it finds a "qualified" AfricanAmerican candidate, it is required to hire that candidate (or another African-American candidate). The Committee is not allowed to make comparative assessments between AfricanAmerican candidates and caucasians (or, for that matter, members of other races). It does not matter whether the Committee
views the African-American candidate as "barely qualified" and
some of the other candidates as "outstanding" or "sensational."
The Committee is still required to recommend that the AfricanAmerican candidate be hired.
As a general rule, after my students read the University's
official policies, many of them are angry. They feel that the programs unfairly discriminate against some citizens based on their
skin color, and that the programs are therefore unconstitutional.
Initially, I ask students to focus on the theoretical, and I try to
get them to do a number of things. First, I want them to consider the history of discrimination in Kentucky. Most of my students are too young to have experienced either slavery or segregation. However, they do have a background of personal
experience relating to race. In addition, there is a consent decree between the Commonwealth and the United States Department of Education which details the history of segregation in
the state. So, I ask students to consider the decree, which states
that there were segregative acts through the 1950s, and that the
system was not desegregated until the early 1980s. Second, once
students understand the history, we talk about a variety of other
theoretical issues: Why did affirmative action programs come
into existence? What "ills" were they trying to remedy? Have
the programs remedied those ills? Effectively? Ineffectively?
At what costs?
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Finally, I present students with problems. For example, at
the University of Kentucky (UK), a Hispanic student was turned
down for a "minority" scholarship on the basis that such aid is
only available to African-Americans. The Hispanic student
wanted to sue. I ask the students to assume that they are in
practice, and encourage them to think about how they would
handle this case. How would they begin? Do they need to investigate the facts? If UK does discriminate against Hispanics, is
the discrimination justified or permissible? What must be shown
in order for it to be permissible? Is it enough to show that there
is a history of discrimination against African-Americans in
higher education in Kentucky? Does it matter how long ago that
discrimination occurred? Does it matter whether there has been
discrimination against Hispanics in higher education in Kentucky? Would it matter that "minority" scholarships are being
given to African-Americans from California or New York (who,
presumably, did not suffer discrimination in Kentucky)?
Finally, if students conclude that UK is in violation of the
Constitution, I want them to think about how they would approach the matter in practice. Can they simply file suit against
UK? Do they have to communicate with UK first? Even if
communication (i.e., a demand letter) were not required, is there
something desirable about "talking" before suing? Might it be
possible to resolve the matter without litigation?
III. EXERCISES
We are also including exercises in our forthcoming First
Amendment casebook. We try to put students in situations like
those they may encounter in practice, and ask them to prepare
written documents relating to those situations. The course is
graded on the basis of class participation and exercises.
By the time students take constitutional law at my school,
they are second year students. They have already taken lots of
exams, and have demonstrated many of the basic skills tested by
such exams (i.e., the ability to "spot" legal issues, to "state" their
knowledge of the law, and to accurately "apply" the law to these
issues). Since many of these students will be practicing law in a
short time, I want them to work with the law in simulated situations. I present students with a constitutional law problem and
ask them how they would handle the problem.
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For example, I might present students with an establishment
clause problem. The City of Louisville recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment
on the basis of sexual preference. A local doctor who is a devout
Christian sincerely believes that homosexuality is "sinful" and is
unwilling to hire a homosexual. The doctor wants to file suit
against the ordinance because it prohibits him from discriminating based on sexual preference. I ask students to assume that
the suit has not been filed, and that the doctor has come to their
law firm for advice. A senior partner has asked the student to
write a legal memo evaluating how to best represent the doctor's
interests.
I hope that students will discuss a number of legal issues.
First, since the doctor does not presently have a member of the
protected class working for him, and has not received a job application from one, I hope that students will talk about potential
standing problems. Whether or not the ordinance transgresses
the Constitution, should suit be filed now? Must the doctor wait
until a member of the protected class applies for a job, or until
he discovers that a member of the class is working for him? I
also want students to talk about free exercise issues. Does the
Free Exercise Clause protect the doctor? Are decisions like
Smith applicable? Can they be distinguished? Under the Kentucky Constitution, does the doctor have a stronger claim (the
Kentucky Constitution is generally more strict on establishment
issues, and more protective on free exercise issues)? So, how
should the doctor proceed? In my class, I also spend time talking about dispute resolution issues. I would like for students to
evaluate whether they should simply file suit (after, of course,
sending a demand letter), or whether it would be helpful to talk
with City officials. I want students to think about whether there
is a mechanism for seeking exemptions from the law's requirements.
The potential downside of this testing method is that students may not study the substantive material as well as they
would for a final exam, and therefore will not come away with as
good an understanding of the basic material. As a result, my
dean, who also asks students to do take home exercises in another substantive course, supplements the exercises with a final
exam designed to test the student's knowledge and understanding of basic doctrine. I do not believe that an exam is necessary.
A properly constructed take home exercise requires a great deal
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of work, and can require intimate knowledge of the basic doctrine.
Does the take home exercise produce different outcomes?
In other words, do some students do better on a take home exam
than they would have done on a traditional final exam? My
sense is "no." Students who do well (or poorly) on a traditional
final exam do similarly on a take home exam. The reasons are
obvious. Students do better on final exams because they have
better reasoning abilities and better writing skills. Students who
do poorly generally lack these attributes. These differences reveal themselves in either type of testing mechanism.
Many years ago, at a New Law Teachers' Workshop, a professor told an interesting story about law school grading. A
number of professors at different law schools gave the same
exam to their students. After the exams were graded, the exams
were sent to the other professors for regrading (without any indication of the grade given by the first professor). The study
found that professors at the various schools gave quite similar
grades. Afterwards, the same exams (again, without any indication of the grades given by the professors) were given to non-law
professors, non-lawyers to grade. Once again, the grades given
were very similar to the grades given by the professors. The
really interesting thing about the study was that the testers also
asked an English Ph.D student to take the exam. This was a
woman who was not a law student, and who had not taken the
course. Even though students who sat through the course
earned "Ds" and "Fs" on the exam, the Ph.D student earned a
low "C."

